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This paper studies pension design from a risk management point of view using a 
lexicographic loss aversion model. Interest in this model stems from the fact that it explains 
income expansion paths of equity and total savings particularly well. I find that all income 
groups are likely to benefit from a PAYGO system, even in the absence of any redistribution. 
Optimal equity investments are close to zero for the two bottom income quintiles and increase 
sharply for higher incomes. The results are compared to optimal pension plans under HARA 
preferences. I find that a PAYGO system has higher value under loss aversion than in the 
HARA case. Moreover, equity shares correspond more closely to empirical observations. 
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Many recent pension reform proposals have been heavily inﬂuenced by rate-of-return
comparisons between alternative retirement systems. A prominent example is President
George W. Bush’s current reform plan for the US. (See for example Shiller, 2005a, for a
detailed description.) Decreasing birth rates as well as increasing longevity have shifted
the implicit returns of a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system downwards. As a result, the
popularity of funded systems has increased substantially. Besides the issue of transition,
the focus on rate-of-return comparisons neglects, however, that diﬀerent pension systems
imply very diﬀerent risk exposures of old-age income. In particular, a PAYGO system
might provide a beneﬁcial downside risk protection of old-age income. A more complete
analysis of optimal pension design therefore requires an evaluation of the risk-return
trade-oﬀs that are associated with the choice between particular pension designs.
A factor which complicates the evaluation of such risk-return trade-oﬀs is income het-
erogeneity. Empirically, members of the two lowest quintiles of the income distribution
typically hold portfolios, including private pensions, with zero equities. In contrast, mem-
bers of the ﬁfth quintile choose portfolios with an equity share of about 54 percent (see
Section 6). The model that is predominantly used in the literature to evaluate risk-return
trade-oﬀs is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model. However, this model pre-
dicts constant equity shares. Thus, it is at odds with the cross-section of risk-return
evaluations that individuals reveal through their private portfolio choices. The policy
implications derived under CRRA preferences are therefore problematic.
The aim of this paper is to study optimal pension design such that the evaluation of
risk-return trade-oﬀs is consistent with the cross-section of individual portfolio choices.
Within the family of expected utility preferences, Stone-Geary or more general HARA
preferences oﬀer an alternative accounting for an increasing pattern of equity shares. The
problem with these preferences is that they have diﬃculties to explain quantitatively
individuals’ equity portfolio shares and total saving rates at the same time.1 Moreover,
1See Binswanger (2005). Calibrations for alternative utility and parameter speciﬁcations not presented
1expected utility models are generally not consistent with the fact that equity holdings are
zero for the two lowest income quintiles.2 The same is true for existing models of habit
formation or loss aversion.3
The lexicographic loss aversion model developed in Binswanger (2005) explains stock-
market nonparticipation of the bottom income quintiles in a simple and parsimonious
way. Beyond this, it explains entire income expansion paths of equity shares and total
saving rates particularly well. For these reasons, the main part of the analysis of this
paper abandons the assumption of expected utility preferences, making use of this lexi-
cographic loss aversion model. However, for the sake of comparison, I also derive optimal
pension plans for various HARA speciﬁcations. Beyond its empirical success, interest
in the lexicographic loss aversion model arises for two reasons. First, loss aversion has
been found an empirically important phenomenon. (But remember that, in contrast to
the lexicographic model, existing loss aversion models are not consistent with zero equity
holdings of low-income earners.) Second, the model is particularly tractable.4
From a more general perspective, this paper aims to take a ﬁrst step towards the
realization of a research program put forward by Poterba (2004) in the context of old-
age provision. He makes the claim that ”future work should (...) try to develop tractable
alternatives to the expected utility framework, and to calibrate these alternatives in a way
that could be used to evaluate household decision making (p. 50).” It might seem odd to
there are available upon request.
2See Haliassos (2002) for an excellent survey. See also Section 6 of this paper. Fixed costs of stock-
market participation allow to account for zero stock holdings of lower-income earners. However, such
ﬁxed costs lead to the prediction of discontinuous income expansion paths for equity shares, which are
not observed empirically.
3See Gomes and Michaelides (2003) and also Haliassos (2002).
4For HARA preferences formulas for the portfolio problem with three risky assets, that is at the core
of the analysis of this paper, are given in Cass and Stiglitz (1970). They are relatively cumbersome.
Moreover, accounting for zero equity shares for lower incomes would require introducing ﬁxed costs
of stock-market participation. Taking these into account, together with nonnegativity constraints, the
problem becomes analytically rather untractable. This is true all the more for existing models of habit
formation or loss aversion.
2use a ”behavioral” model, exhibiting loss aversion, for a normative evaluation of old-age
provision and pension design. However, this would only be inconsistent if the meaning
of ”behavioral” is understood as ”irrational.” Are loss aversion preferences irrational?
Kahneman and Tversky (1991, p. 1057) conclude that this is not the case whenever
actual experiences indeed correspond to the feeling of loss aversion. I adopt this position,
accepting from a normative point of view that people legitimately are particularly averse
to outcomes that undercut some speciﬁc consumption threshold levels.
This paper follows the approach of Baxter and King (2001), Campbell et al. (2001),
Poterba et al. (2003), Poterba (2004) and Gollier (2005) by considering pension design
from the perspective of an individual portfolio choice problem in a partial equilibrium
setting. My analysis departs from this literature in that I do not assume CRRA prefer-
ences. Furthermore, I explicitly derive optimal contribution rates for a PAYGO system,
exploring whether such a system is particularly beneﬁcial in the presence of loss aversion.
To focus on the role of income heterogeneity and loss aversion, the analysis takes place
in a simple two-period setting. Individuals can invest in bonds and stocks. In addition
to these private investment opportunities, they can ”invest” in a hypothetical ”PAYGO
asset.” I derive optimal expenditure shares for these three investments opportunities. In
order to realize an optimal policy, a social planner would implement a mandatory PAYGO
system where contribution rates are set equal to the expenditure shares of hypothetical
PAYGO investments.
The returns of the PAYGO system, as considered in this paper, are determined simply
by the growth rate of aggregate wages. The idea is to focus on a PAYGO system in its
purest form where all return risks are borne by retirees and there are neither beneﬁt
guarantees nor is there any intragenerational redistribution. Ultimately, the goal is to
shed light on the question of whether a system with less generous beneﬁt guarantees than
current systems will provide a sustainable reform option. By design, systems without
beneﬁt guarantees are not exposed to the danger of a ”cost explosion” as a consequence
of low fertility rates.5
5The formal analysis abstracts from political risks aﬀecting the payouts of a PAYGO system. This
3The main ﬁndings are as follows. Under loss aversion, a PAYGO system in the manner
described above generally oﬀers a more favorable downside risk protection of old-age
income than bond investments. This is true even in the absence of redistribution and for
the entire range of incomes. In contrast, only the two highest income quintiles will beneﬁt
from a funded component with substantial equity investments. To put these results into
perspective, I also provide calibrations for HARA preferences. The main diﬀerences are
the following. First, a PAYGO system has higher value under loss aversion. Second,
prescribed equity shares correspond more closely to individuals’ actual portfolio choices
under lexicographic loss aversion preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical downside
risk of alternative pension investments. Section 3 introduces a baseline version of the
lexicographic loss aversion model. Section 4 explores the conditions under which a PAYGO
system is beneﬁcial and provides calibrations for optimal pension plans under baseline
preferences. Section 5 presents calibrations for an extended version of those preferences,
taking into account a more general shape of risk aversion. Section 6 compares the results
from the two lexicographic models to optimal pension plans under HARA preferences.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Downside Risk of Alternative Pension Components
This section provides descriptive evidence regarding the downside risks of alternative
means of old-age provision. The focus on downside risk is motivated by the fact that,
due to loss aversion, this risk component is a ﬁrst-order issue for a behaviorally oriented
analysis of risk management. As described in the introduction, I focus on a PAYGO sys-
tem in its purest form where the returns are simply given by the growth rate of aggregate
wage income. The geometric average of real annual wage income growth has been 3.6
percent for the US from 1929 to 2004. The corresponding standard deviation amounts
is justiﬁed in a ﬁrst step exactly by the absence of any beneﬁt guarantees, assuring the viability of the
PAYGO system.
4to 5.5 percent.6 For real bond returns, measured as an average of money market rates
and long-term bond returns, the geometric mean has been 1.6 percent with a standard
deviation of 6.1 percent for the same time period.7 For stocks the corresponding ﬁgures
are 6.1 and 19.0 percent.8
These ﬁgures are not too informative with regard to downside risk exposures for two
reasons. First, future growth rates of aggregate wage income are expected to fall well be-
low historical rates. Second, the precise implications of the diﬀerent standard deviations
for downside risks are unclear. Therefore, I calculate bottom percentiles of the respective
return distributions cumulated over a time horizon of 32 years.9 Concerning PAYGO
6Data source: NIPA Table 1.10. Aggregate wage income is measured by compensation of employees
and deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator.
7Throughout the paper, I use historical returns of nominal bonds as a proxy for future returns rather
than returns of inﬂation protected bonds such as TIPS. The reason is that there is very little historical
knowledge regarding the range of returns of the latter. Their current (08/01/05) long-term returns are
about 2 percent p.a. (source: US Department of the Treasury). Thus, they exceed the historical average
of real returns of ordinary bonds. However, if anything, in an equilibrium the returns of TIPS should be
lower than the expected returns of ordinary bonds because the former are not exposed to inﬂation risk.
8Data source for bond and stock returns: Shiller (2005b) and http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/
ShillerSocSec.xls.
9Under the assumption that working age lasts from age 21 to 65 and death takes place at age 87 (see
below), the time horizon of 32 years corresponds to the average length of individuals’ investment horizon.
To see this note that 32 equals the distance between the middle of 65 and 87 and the middle of 21 and
65, minus one. The subtraction of one year refers to the assumption that savings are invested at the end
of a particular year during working age, but are withdrawn at the beginning of a particular year during
retirement. The death age of 87 corresponds to the projected average life-expectancy of men and women
at age 65 for the year 2080 (Board of Trustees, 2005). The joint distribution of bond, stock and PAYGO
returns is derived as follows. It is assumed that logs of annual returns are jointly normal and iid. This is
a usual assumption which guarantees that net level returns are never lower than minus 100 percent (or
gross level returns never fall below zero). The means of annual log returns are set equal to the arithmetic
averages of historical annual log returns minus .5 times their respective variances (where historical returns
are adjusted for the PAYGO system as described in footnote 10). This assures that the expected values
of annual level returns correspond to the geometric averages of historical returns. The covariance matrix
of log returns is set equal to the covariance matrix of historical log returns. Means and the covariance
5returns, I assume that the distribution of aggregate wage income growth is shifted down-
wards such that expected annual growth rates correspond to long-run projections of the
Social Security Administration for the growth rates of productivity and the labor force.10
The standard deviation is left unadjusted.
Figure 1 depicts the cumulated 32-year return levels corresponding to the ten lowest
percentiles. The red solid line corresponds to the PAYGO system. The green dashed and
blue dotted line represent bond and stock returns, respectively. For each percentile, the
curves indicate a return level that is undercut with a probability equal to the value of this
respective percentile. E.g. returns corresponding to the ﬁfth percentile are undercut with
a probability of 5 percent. The lower a return level corresponding to a certain percentile,
the higher is the downside risk exposure of the respective return distribution.
Inspection of Figure 1 shows that the downside risk exposure of the PAYGO system
is very limited in comparison to bonds and stocks. For example, for the ﬁfth percentile,
the PAYGO return equals 2 percent, whereas bond and stock returns equal minus 8 and
minus 31 percent, respectively. To put these ﬁgures into perspective, note that expected
32-year returns equal 77, 69 and 659 percent for the PAYGO system, bonds and stocks,
respectively. What is surprising is the large diﬀerence between the downside risk exposures
of PAYGO and bond returns. This is especially true in light of the fact that the level of
PAYGO returns has been adjusted downwards according to projections for future wage
income growth. The downside risk of stocks is still considerably larger than for bonds. The
rest of the paper explores optimal pension design in light of the downside risk exposures
shown in Figure 1 as well as the expected returns associated with alternative pension
components.
matrix of log returns for a period of 32 years simply equal 32 times the annual log means and covariance
matrix, respectively. 1,000,000 log return realizations are randomly drawn from the 32-year distribution
and converted to level returns to determine return percentiles (and the correlations used in Section 5).
10For the long-run the Social Security Administration projects an annual productivity growth rate of
1.6 percent and a growth rate of the labor force of 0.2 percent for the intermediate scenario. (See Board
of Trustees, 2005, Table V.B1 and V.B2. Short-run projections are higher.) I take these ﬁgures to infer
a future expected annual growth rate of aggregate wage income of 1.8 percent.






























Figure 1. Downside risk of PAYGO system, bonds
and stocks.
3 Lexicographic Loss Aversion Preferences: A Base-
line Speciﬁcation
This section introduces lexicographic life-cycle preferences as developed in Binswanger
(2005). These preferences are speciﬁed in an extreme way, as (inﬁnite) loss aversion is the
only source of risk aversion. This represents a limit case of some possibly richer preference
structure. It provides a simple approximation to actual evaluations of risky consumption
prospects. In spite of their extreme nature, these preferences explain individuals’ portfolio
and savings choices surprisingly well, indicating that they indeed capture some fundamen-
tal principle of risk evaluations. Moreover, this baseline preference version allows studying
the implications of loss aversion for optimal risk management separately from diversiﬁ-
cation issues. Section 5 will introduce an augmented version of lexicographic preferences
allowing for a more general shape of risk aversion.
According to Binswanger (2005) preferences are lexicographic over the list
Π = {I(˜ c
min
2 ≥ αc1), min[c1,¯ c], E˜ c2(c1 − ¯ c)
γ}, (1)
which constitutes a list of three hierarchically ordered ”goals” that a decision maker seeks
7to achieve. c1 and ˜ c2 represent working age and retirement consumption, respectively.
The tilde indicates that retirement consumption is risky as it depends on the outcome of
risky investments. ˜ cmin
2 denotes the minimum of old-age consumption. In the setting that
will be considered, it is assured that a strictly positive value of ˜ cmin
2 is always feasible.
α > 0, ¯ c > 0 and γ > 0 are the three parameters of the model. I denotes the indicator
function. E denotes the mathematical expectation operator.
Individual behavior is determined by the maximization of element or goal i in (1),
subject to achieving the maximum of all elements/goals with an index smaller than i, and
subject to the budget constraint. Consider the ﬁrst goal. It takes a value of one whenever
˜ cmin
2 ≥ αc1, and of zero otherwise. Consequently, individuals are inﬁnitely loss averse
as they will never choose a consumption plan for which it is not assured that at least a
fraction α of working-age consumption can be consumed during retirement. I will refer
to the reference point αc1 as a habit level. Note that the ﬁrst goal can always be fully
achieved whenever there is an asset with a minimum gross return that strictly exceeds
zero (meaning that the net return exceeds minus 100 percent).
Consider next the second goal, which embodies the desire to achieve an average stan-
dard of living ¯ c. Put diﬀerently, ¯ c represents an exogenous reference point for the eval-
uation of c1.11 Combining the ﬁrst and the second goal it follows that an individual
maximizes c1 s.t. ˜ cmin
2 ≥ αc1 and the budget constraint, as long as income is suﬃciently
low such that the resulting optimal choice of c1 does not exceed ¯ c. Otherwise, satiation
of the ﬁrst two goals is feasible. In this case, behavior is determined by the third goal,
which is residual in nature. It speciﬁes a desire for ”speculative” savings in the sense of a
preference for high expected levels of old-age consumption. Beyond this, it speciﬁes non-
satiation in c1 and a complementarity between c1 and E˜ c2. Subtracting ¯ c from c1 assures
that c1 is a strictly normal good at all income levels. Note that γ simply represents the
11See Binswanger (2005) for a more thorough discussion. Note that the ﬁrst goal implies that ˜ c2 is
implicitly evaluated against a reference point α¯ c parallel to c1 being evaluated against ¯ c. Clearly, average
standards of living increase over time. The analysis of this paper abstracts from economic growth,
however, such that such a time-dependence is neglected.
8inverse of a standard discount factor. To see this take logs of the third goal. If behavior
is determined by the third goal, individuals maximize E˜ c2(c1 −¯ c)γ s.t. c1 > ¯ c, ˜ cmin
2 ≥ αc1
and the budget constraint.
4 Optimal Pension Plans: Baseline Case
As described in the introduction, optimal pension design is analyzed from the perspec-
tive of an individual portfolio choice problem, where the distribution of bond, stock and
PAYGO returns is taken as exogenously given. I consider a hypothetical environment
where individuals can freely decide how much to invest in bonds, stocks and a ”PAYGO
asset.” The returns of the latter are given by the growth rate of aggregate wages. Thus,
there is no intragenerational redistribution. Optimally chosen expenditure shares for hy-
pothetical PAYGO investments correspond to the optimal contribution rates that a social
planner would set for a real mandatory PAYGO system in the absence of intragenerational
redistribution. In a stationary state of the economy, any generation would beneﬁt from
the presence of such a mandatory system.
The ﬁrst part of this section is concerned with a purely theoretical analysis of the
conditions under which a PAYGO system beneﬁcially contributes to risk management.
It will be explored whether these conditions vary between diﬀerent income classes. The
second part of this section provides a calibration of optimal old-age provision.
Does a PAYGO System Beneﬁcially Contribute to Risk Manage-
ment?
Let us start the analysis by introducing some notation. Gross bond returns are denoted




. Similarly, gross PAYGO
returns are denoted by ˜ z ∈ [z,z]. Consistent with the evidence in Section 2, I assume
that bond returns have a higher minimum return but also a lower expected return than
12Note that gross returns equal net returns plus 1 (or plus 100 percent).
9stocks. Moreover, I assume that the same is true for the PAYGO asset.13
Assumption 1 (i) x > y, E˜ x < E˜ y, (ii) z > y, E˜ z < E˜ y.
The position of the PAYGO asset with respect to bonds on the risk-return scale is left
open at this point. Next, I assume that there is a positive probability that all three assets
will take their minimum value.
Assumption 2 Pr

˜ x = x, ˜ y = y, ˜ z = z

> 0.
This assumption excludes that diversiﬁcation can increase the minimum return of a port-
folio. As it is plausible to expect that returns on all three assets are particularly low
within some ”catastrophic” state of the economy, this is a natural assumption.
Denote bond investments by b, stock investments by s and PAYGO investments by p.
A ﬁnal assumption rules out the possibility of borrowing and short-selling.
Assumption 3 b ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, p ≥ 0.
This is a realistic assumption for all but the highest incomes and is therefore important
to be taken into account.
Let us start the analysis by considering optimal portfolio plans for lower incomes.
Note that information about minimum and expected returns is generally suﬃcient for the
derivation of optimal portfolios under preferences (1). Consider an individual with an
income w that is smaller or equal to
α+max[x, z]
max[x, z] ¯ c ≡ wcrit. Let us hypothesize that only the
ﬁrst two goals in (1) are active for this income range. As discussed in Section 3, optimal
choices are then determined by the program
max c1, s.t. ˜ c
min
2 = αc1. (2)
13From a purely theoretical point of view, minimum gross returns are zero (or minimum net returns
minus 100 percent) for any ﬁnancial asset, as there is some small but positive probability that economies
will enter into a disastrous state such as a war. From a more pragmatic point of view, one will identify
”minimum” returns with return levels that are exceeded with a high probability, e.g. 95 percent.
10It follows directly from this program that the individual will only invest in the asset
with the highest minimum return. (Note that ˜ cmin
2 = bx + sy + pz.) This allows her to
assure habit consumption αc1 with the least amount of resources for any given level of c1.
Consequently, she reaches the highest feasible level of c1.
With respect to the desirability of a PAYGO asset, it follows that the individual will
beneﬁt from such an asset if and only if it exhibits the highest minimum return, i.e.
if and only if z > x. Remember, however, that this result depends on the hypothesis
that only the ﬁrst two goals of preferences (1) are relevant for w ≤ wcrit. The validity
of this assumption has still to be checked. If the individual invests only in the assets
with the highest minimum return, it follows from (2) that c1 =
max[x, z]
α+max[x, z]w. (Use ˜ cmin
2 =
(w − c1) · max[x, z].) From w ≤ wcrit it follows that c1 ≤ ¯ c. This conﬁrms that for
w ≤ wcrit, behavior is indeed determined by program (2). This allows stating the following
result.
Proposition 1 Assume w ≤
α+max[x, z]
max[x, z] ¯ c ≡ wcrit. Then c1 ≤ ¯ c, and individuals invest
only in the asset with the highest minimum return. The PAYGO asset is beneﬁcial if and
only if z > x.
Proof. See the text above.
Proposition 1 implies that individuals with an income below wcrit are best oﬀ when
having all their private savings replaced by a PAYGO system, whenever the PAYGO
system oﬀers the highest minimum returns in the economy. It is the loss aversion property
of preferences (1) that implies this strong result. If individuals cannot freely invest in the
PAYGO asset, then they will also invest in bonds whenever the coverage trough a PAYGO
system is lower than optimal. In contrast, they will never invest in stocks. Thus, the
model is consistent with the empirical fact that low-income earners do not hold equities.
Remember from the introduction that this is not the case for existing loss aversion models,
incorporating this phenomenon into an expected utility framework.14
14See Binswanger (2005) for a discussion.
11I turn next to the case of high incomes where all three preference goals are relevant.
It follows from the above analysis that this is the case when w > wcrit. Let us start with
a portfolio for which b > 0 and the individual is constrained to choose p = 0. (It follows
from Binswanger (2005) that under the latter constraint b > 0 holds whenever γ ≥ ¯ ¯ γ, or
γ < ¯ ¯ γ and w < ¯ ¯ w, where ¯ ¯ γ ≡
yΩ
α(x−y)E˜ y, ¯ ¯ w ≡
(α+y)Ω
yΩ−αγ(x−y)E˜ y¯ c and Ω ≡ (α+x)E˜ y−(α+y)E˜ x.
For very low values of γ, combined with high incomes, the individual might only invest in
stocks.) Consider now the conditions under which the individual will be better oﬀ when
given the opportunity to choose p > 0. This will be the case if and only if there exists a
portfolio reallocation (∆b, ∆s ,∆p) modifying the initial portfolio such that
∆p > 0, ∆b < 0,
∆c1 = ∆b + ∆s + ∆p = 0,
∆˜ c
min
2 = ∆bx + ∆sy + ∆pz = 0,
∆E˜ c2 = ∆bE˜ x + ∆sE˜ y + ∆pE˜ z > 0.
(3)
To see this, note that the reallocation will indeed increase the value of the third goal in (1)
while leaving the value of the ﬁrst and second goal unaﬀected. To see the converse, note
that the only other possibility to increase the third goal is to increase either only c1, or c1
and E˜ c2 together. By continuity this is feasible whenever the reallocation (3) is feasible.
Furthermore, the second to forth line in (3) and Assumption 1 imply sign∆b 6= sign∆p.
Note that the reallocation (3) is feasible only when b > 0 initially.15
Whenever there exists a reallocation fulﬁlling (3), then optimal bond holdings are zero.
This follows from the fact that this type of reallocation is feasible for any value of b > 0.
Noting this and solving the system (3), we get the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume w > wcrit. Furthermore, assume γ ≥ ¯ ¯ γ, or γ < ¯ ¯ γ and w < ¯ ¯ w,
where ¯ ¯ γ ≡
yΩ
α(x−y)E˜ y, ¯ ¯ w ≡
(α+y)Ω
yΩ−αγ(x−y)E˜ y¯ c and Ω ≡ (α + x)E˜ y − (α + y)E˜ x. Then
i. b > 0 in the absence of a PAYGO asset,
15See Binswanger (2004) for a fully-ﬂedged analysis of the investment problem with three risky assets.
12ii. the PAYGO asset is beneﬁcial if and only if




E˜ z > xE˜ y − yE˜ x, (4)
iii. b = 0 if (4) holds.
Proof. See the text above. To obtain condition (4) solve (3) using the second and third
line to express ∆b and ∆s in ∆p. Insert the resulting expressions in the forth line in (3)
and remember that we require ∆p > 0.
Remember that γ ≥ ¯ ¯ γ, or γ < ¯ ¯ γ and w < ¯ ¯ w simply assure that b > 0 in the absence
of the PAYGO asset. (It can be checked that wcrit < ¯ ¯ w.) Condition (4) provides an
amazingly simple criterion for the desirability of a PAYGO system. A particularly nice
feature of this condition is that it is straightforward to evaluate empirically, which will be
done in the next subsection. Note that evaluation of (4) does not even require information
about preference parameters. Not surprisingly, this condition requires that z or E˜ z must
not be too low. Speciﬁcally, it rules out z < x, E˜ z < E˜ x, i.e. that the PAYGO system
is dominated by bonds. The simplicity of condition (4) is particularly welcome when
noting that no condition of comparable transparency can be expected to be obtained for
expected utility models. This conclusion is inferred from the analysis of Eeckhoudt and
Gollier (2001), and Gollier (2001, Ch. 10). They show that even the introduction of
only a second risky asset, in addition to another already available risky asset, is a very
intricate issue. In light of their results, the case of three risky assets, which is relevant
here, appears to be very diﬃcult to characterize under expected utility preferences.
The result that optimal bond holdings are zero whenever (4) holds may be surprising
at ﬁrst sight. This is explained by the fact that pure loss aversion is the only driving
force of risk aversion in the preference speciﬁcation (1). This excludes a diversiﬁcation
motive for portfolio allocation. However, abstracting from diversiﬁcation allows exploring
the implications of loss aversion, a ﬁrst-order issue for a behaviorally oriented analysis of
risk management, in a most transparent way. Section 5 will present an enriched version
of the lexicographic model that accounts for a more general aversion to the dispersion of
old-age consumption.
13Before turning to an empirical evaluation of condition (4) and the calibration of op-
timal pension plans, let us complete the theoretical analysis by considering the values of
γ and w that are not covered by Proposition 1 and 2. For these, the habit level αc1 and
thus satiation of the ﬁrst goal in (1) can be achieved merely by stock investments. Thus,
a PAYGO asset will not have any value.
Calibration of Optimal Pension Plans
Let us start the numerical analysis of optimal pension plans by evaluating condition
(4). This requires only information about expected values and minimum realizations of
the growth rate of aggregate wage income and bond and stock returns. As indicated
in Section 2, expected values amount to 77, 69 and 659 percent for a time horizon of
32 years, respectively. For the speciﬁcation of minimum returns I use ﬁfth percentiles.
They corresponds most closely to the idea of return levels that are exceeded with a
high probability while not representing excessively conservative speciﬁcations of minimum
returns. According to Section 2, minimum returns are thus 2, minus 8 and minus 31
percent for the PAYGO system, bonds and stocks, respectively. In light of these ﬁgures,
the PAYGO system dominates bonds with respect to both, expected values and minimum
returns, implying that (4) holds.16
In the following, I discuss ﬁrst the numerical speciﬁcation of preference parameters.
Then I indicate the formulas for optimal investment/pension plans corresponding to the
respective parameter ranges. Finally, the formulas are used to obtain a calibration of
optimal plans. There are three preference parameters to be speciﬁed numerically: α, γ,
¯ c. Concerning α, let us ﬁrst ﬁnd a value that seems appropriate when comparing average
annual consumption during retirement to average annual consumption during working
life. Following Binswanger (2005), I set the fraction of annual active period consumption
that individuals do not allow to be undercut by annual retirement consumption equal to
the average US Social Security replacement rate. The latter amounts to .4 (see Munnell,
16Remember from Figure 1 that this conclusion is robust to changes in percentiles.
142004). This value has to be adjusted to take into account that the retirement period
typically lasts for fewer years than working life. This happens by multiplying the Social
Security replacement rate by the ratio of the length of retirement to the length of working
life.17 The resulting numerical value of α amounts to .20.
Concerning γ, inspection of (1) shows that it just represents the inverse of a standard
discount factor. Take logs of the third goal to see this. In the life-cycle literature a
usual speciﬁcation of the annual discount factor is .96 (see e.g. Campbell et al., 2001).
Raising this number to the power of 32 (the model’s time horizon) and taking the inverse
yields a raw estimate of γ. I multiply this raw speciﬁcation by the ratio of the length of
retirement to the length of active life, again to account for the fact that the retirement
period is typically shorter than working age. This yields a numerical speciﬁcation for
γ of 7.5. The ﬁnal parameter ¯ c is set to 25,000 year 2001 US dollars. It is shown in
Binswanger (2005) that this value does a particularly good job in capturing the empirical
income threshold separating households which invest in stocks from households that do
not. Assumption 4 summarizes the numerical model speciﬁcation.
Assumption 4 (i) α = .20, ¯ c = 25,000, γ = 7.5, (ii) E˜ x = 1.69, x = 0.92, E˜ y = 6.59,
y = 0.69, E˜ z = 1.77, z = 1.02.
For the case where z > x and (4) holds, Proposition 1 and 2, together with the last
paragraph in the last subsection, imply that b = 0 for all income levels. As a result, under
Assumption 4 optimal plans coincide with the plans that are chosen when only stocks and
the PAYGO asset are available. The formulas for optimal investments corresponding to
this two-asset problem can be taken from Binswanger (2005). For the parameter range
corresponding to Assumption 4 they are as follows.
Proposition 3 If z > x and (4) holds, then b = 0 for all income levels. Moreover, under
17See footnote 9 for the assumptions regarding the length of working age and retirement. The speciﬁca-
tion of α by means of average life-expectancies is only valid under the availability of annuities. Otherwise,
one would have to account for the risk of outliving one’s assets such that a higher value of α would be
appropriate.
15Assumption 4 we have
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o
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α
α+yw if w ≥ ˆ ˆ w
,
where ˆ w ≡
(α+z)ˆ Ω
zˆ Ω−αγ(z−y)E˜ z¯ c, ˆ ˆ w ≡
(α+y)ˆ Ω
yˆ Ω−αγ(z−y)E˜ y¯ c and ˆ Ω ≡ (α + z)E˜ y − (α + y)E˜ z.
Proof. See the text above and Binswanger (2005).
The formulas in Proposition 3 can be used to calibrate optimal pension/investment
plans. Figure 2 shows optimal expenditure shares for PAYGO and stock investments, i.e.
p
w and s
w, as well as their sum. The red bold solid line corresponds to PAYGO investments.
The dotted blue line represents equity investments. The thin solid azure line represents
the sum of both. Remember that optimal bond investments are zero. Remember also
that a social planner would set contribution rates of a mandatory PAYGO system equal
to optimal PAYGO expenditure shares. If the latter diﬀer between diﬀerent incomes then
it would be necessary to implement separate PAYGO systems for diﬀerent income classes.
For income levels below 34,000 year 2001 dollars, households are best oﬀ by having
all their savings substituted by a PAYGO system.18 The optimal PAYGO contribution
rate amounts to 16 percent. According to the income quintile estimates of the US Census
Bureau for 2001, this concerns the two lowest income quintiles.19 Optimal equity savings
are zero. For income levels between 34,000 and 53,000, corresponding to the third income
quintile, the PAYGO rate drops from 16 to 8 percent, while equity savings increase from
zero to 11 percent. This implies that the equity share, deﬁned as equity savings relative to
18Income levels should be understood as annual permanent incomes.
19See http:/www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h01ar.html.
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Figure 2. Optimal investment rates under lexico-
graphic loss aversion, baseline case.
total savings including PAYGO savings, increases from 0 to 58 percent. For the upper limit
of the forth quintile, amounting to 83,000, the PAYGO rate equals 3 percent and equity
savings amount to about 19 percent, implying an equity share of 88 percent. PAYGO
rates approach zero at an income of 114,000 where equity savings approach 22 percent.20
Total saving rates increase from 16 percent to 22 percent over the entire range of in-
comes. In contrast, empirical estimates for saving rates, including Social Security savings,
range from 7 to 14 percent for the two lowest income quintiles. For the ﬁfth quintile they
range from 24 to 34 percent.21 Thus, the total saving rates in Figure 2 exceed empirical
saving rates for low incomes while they fall short of saving rates of the rich. However, it
20Compared to empirical observations, the equity shares derived here are higher for the three upper
income quintiles (see Section 6 and Table 2). In order to match empirical equity shares, a higher α would
be needed. Remember that in this paper α has been set proportional to the average length of retirement.
In Binswanger (2005) it is shown that empirical equity shares are matched almost perfectly when α is set
proportional to the 99th percentile of the length of retirement. This conservative speciﬁcation accounts
for the risk of outliving one’s assets. However, in the context of pensions, where investment payouts are
annuitized, determining α according to the average length of retirement seems more appropriate. See
also footnote 17.
21See Dynan et al. (2004).
17should be noted that empirical saving rates are low for the bottom quintiles partly because
of redistributive elements within Social Security and other welfare programs, which have
been neglected by the analysis here.
To get a further feeling with regard to the sensibility of the saving rates in Figure
2, consider the probability that annual old-age consumption falls short of 40 percent of
annual working-age consumption. Minimum returns have been identiﬁed with the returns
corresponding to the ﬁfth percentile. For optimal choices we have ˜ cmin
2 = αc1, where α
has been set such that it corresponds to an annual value of 40 percent. Thus, annual
old-age consumption is lower than 40 percent of annual working-age consumption with a
probability of about 5 percent for the saving rates shown in Figure 2. As a consequence,
if saving rates are smaller than indicated in the ﬁgure, annual old-consumption falls short
of 40 percent of annual working-age consumption with a probability that is higher than 5
percent. Since a replacement rate of 40 percent is rather low, the downside risk exposure
of old-age income then becomes substantial.
5 Optimal Pension Plans under Generalized Risk Aver-
sion
This section presents a calibration of optimal pension plans accounting for a more general
pattern of risk aversion. In particular, preferences are augmented by an aversion to the
dispersion of old-age consumption, in addition to loss aversion. Speciﬁcally, preferences
are given by
Π
0 = {I(˜ c
min
2 ≥ αc1, σ (˜ c2) ≤ θ(E˜ c2)E˜ c2), min[c1,¯ c], E˜ c2(c1 − ¯ c)
γ}, (5)
where σ (˜ c2) denotes the standard deviation of ˜ c2 and θ > 0 represents a parameter that
might depend on E˜ c2. Thus, achieving the ﬁrst goal now requires not only assuring
habit consumption during old-age, but also that the dispersion of old-age consumption,
measured by its standard deviation, must not exceed a certain fraction of expected old-age
18consumption.
Preferences (5) represent the most direct extension of the baseline version (1) of lex-
icographic preferences. However, this speciﬁcation suﬀers from the fact that it may not
be feasible to achieve the inequalities ˜ cmin
2 ≥ αc1 and σ (˜ c2) ≤ θE˜ c2 simultaneously for
certain values of α and θ. This problem is addressed by assuming that behavior is de-




0,αc1 − ˜ c
min
2
2 − λmax(0,σ (E˜ c2) − θE˜ c2)
2 (6)
whenever the resulting value of c1 falls short of ¯ c, and
E˜ c2 (c1 − ¯ c)
γ − λmax
 
0,αc1 − ˜ c
min
2
2 − λmax(0,σ (E˜ c2) − θE˜ c2)
2 , (7)
otherwise. λ is a penalty parameter representing a large but ﬁnite number.22
Note that for these objective functions the rate of risk aversion is no longer inﬁnite
as for preferences (1) or (5). Thus, individuals are ready to trade oﬀ violations of the
inequalities ˜ cmin
2 ≥ αc1 and σ (˜ c2) ≤ θE˜ c2. Because of this, and due to the more general
speciﬁcation of risk aversion, the extended model (6) and (7) is certainly more appeal-
ing from a normative point of view than the preference model (1). Therefore, policy
implications that are inferred from the analysis of this paper should be mainly based
on the results developed in this section rather than the previous one. Nevertheless, the
behavioral foundations of preferences (1), i.e. loss aversion with respect to a habit level
of consumption and with respect to a normal standard of living, are entirely preserved.
The comparison of the prescriptions of the model (6) and (7) with the prescriptions of
the baseline preference model discussed in the last section allows a clear-cut identiﬁcation
of which elements of an optimal pension plan are due to pure loss aversion and which
elements are explained by a diversiﬁcation motive.
The income expansion paths for PAYGO, bond and equity saving rates are derived
numerically, using grid search. The values of θ are speciﬁed such that a good ﬁt to
22While the functions (6) and (7) resemble mean-variance utility functions, they have the advantage
that they do not imply decreasing income expansion paths for equity shares.
19Table 1: Correlation matrix of return rates.
PAYGO Bonds Stocks
PAYGO 1 -0.26 0.29
Bonds -0.26 1 0.12
Stocks 0.29 0.12 1
empirical equity shares is obtained for the ”private” investment problem where there are
only stocks and bonds available. This leads to values of θ that are constant at .13 in the
domain where behavior is determined by (6). In the domain where behavior is determined
by (7), θ starts to increase smoothly up to .41.23 Expected and minimum return rates are
again speciﬁed according to Assumption 4. For the objective functions (6) and (7) optimal
plans depend on correlations between diﬀerent return rates. The correlation matrix for
the case where bond, stock and PAYGO returns are jointly lognormal is shown in Table
1.24
The results are shown in Figure 3. The bold solid red line represents the PAYGO
rate, the green dashed and dotted blue line correspond to bonds and stocks, respectively.
The thin solid azure line shows the sum of all three investment rates. For incomes up
to 40,000 the PAYGO rate equals 8 percent, bond investments amount to 7 percent and
stock investments to one percent. Comparing the left parts of Figure 3 and Figure 2 shows
that dispersion aversion makes the case for positive bond investments. Speciﬁcally, for
lower incomes about half of optimal PAYGO investments under baseline preferences are
substituted by bonds due to the negative correlation between bond and PAYGO returns
(see Table 1). In addition, in contrast to the baseline case, it is optimal to invest even
23Speciﬁcally, values for θ are derived using an ”indirect utility” approach. Four values of θ are speciﬁed
such that median equity shares from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2001 are ﬁtted for median
incomes for the four upper SCF income quintiles, subject to the constraint that θ ≥ 0.01. For these four
income levels, behavior is determined by the objective function (7). For the median income of the ﬁrst
SCF income quintile, for which behavior is determined by (6), θ is set to the same value as for the second
quintile. For intermediate incomes, θ is obtained by interpolation.
24The derivation of the joint distribution is described in footnote 9.
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Figure 3. Optimal investment rates under lexico-
graphic loss aversion, generalized risk aversion.
a very small amount in equities at low incomes. However, the two most basic insights
of Figure 2 are preserved. First, optimal PAYGO rates are substantial. Second, optimal
equity shares are very low.
For incomes exceeding 40,000 the marginal propensity to save increases because be-
havior is now determined by maximization of (7). Additionally, the marginal propensity
to risky saving raises as θ is now increasing. The ﬁrst-order eﬀect of increased risk-taking
is an increase in the equity savings rate. Associated with this is a substitution of bonds
by PAYGO savings. Note that the latter are higher for all income levels exceeding 40,000
than for incomes below this level. The reason is that under loss aversion, PAYGO invest-
ments are better complements to equities than bonds, as they oﬀer a better protection
against the downside risks associated with equity investments.25 Speciﬁcally, it turns out
that bonds do not make any valuable contribution to the reduction of old-age income
dispersion above 60,000. Between 40,000 and 60,000 the propensity to risky savings takes
intermediate values. As a result, PAYGO investments increase with higher equity in-
vestments to compensate the sharp drop in bond investments and also to account for an
25See also Section 6.
21increased propensity to total savings. For incomes exceeding 60,000, the propensity to
risky savings is suﬃciently high such that the PAYGO rate decreases to 9 percent whereas
equity savings increase to 10 percent.
Total saving rates increase from 16 to 19 percent and are thus somewhat lower than
in Figure 2. Equity shares increase from 6 percent for low incomes to 53 percent for high
incomes. Thus, their variation is more moderate than for the baseline version of the model.
However, it is still considerable. Overall, the two most important diﬀerences between
Figure 3 and Figure 2 are the following. First, relatively high PAYGO rates remain
desirable for high incomes under generalized risk aversion. Second, bond investment rates
are substantial for low incomes. In contrast, bond investments coincide with the baseline
version of the model for higher incomes where they are zero.
6 Comparison to HARA Preferences
In order to highlight the speciﬁc implications of lexicographic loss aversion preferences for
optimal pension design, it is useful to make the comparison to optimal plans under ex-
pected utility preferences. As discussed in the introduction, constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) preferences do not leave any role for income heterogeneity with respect to in-
vestment rates. As a result, the comparison between optimal pension plans under CRRA
and under lexicographic preferences is not of particular interest. Therefore, I choose a
relatively general HARA speciﬁcation as a benchmark to which the prescriptions of the
lexicographic model should be compared.
Speciﬁcally, I consider the HARA speciﬁcation
U (c1, ˜ c2) =
1
1 − η




E (˜ c2 − ¯ ¯ c2)
1−η . (8)
The parameters of this utility function are η, governing relative risk aversion, ¯ ¯ c1 > 0,
¯ ¯ c2 > 0, representing age-speciﬁc subsistence levels of consumption, and β, representing
the time discount factor. E denotes the mathematical expectation operator. The utility
function (8) is well behaved only for the case where c1 > ¯ ¯ c1, ˜ c2 > ¯ ¯ c2. Note that relative
22risk aversion is equal to η in the limit case where consumption equals inﬁnity. For ﬁnite
consumption values relative risk aversion exceeds η. Note further that the limit case where
η = 1 corresponds to the usual log version of Stone-Geary preferences.
For the derivation of optimal pension plans, the return distributions are truncated
below at the ﬁfth percentile in order to avoid that saving rates become excessively high
due to the fact that feasibility of subsistence consumptions has to be assured with proba-
bility one. Additionally, return distributions are truncated at the top in such a way that
expected values of the truncated distributions correspond to historical geometric means.
Figures 4a to 4d present optimal pension plans for four diﬀerent parameter constella-
tions. In all ﬁgures, the bold solid red line represents the PAYGO rate, the green dashed
and dotted blue line correspond to bonds and stocks, respectively. The thin solid azure
line shows the sum of all three investment rates. Note that for incomes at the left end of
the diagrams optimal choices are not deﬁned. The reason is that income is not suﬃcient
to cover subsistence consumptions. Figure 4a shows optimal plans for a baseline speci-
ﬁcation where parameters are chosen strictly on an ex-ante basis. In particular, ¯ ¯ c1 and
¯ ¯ c2 are set to age-speciﬁc poverty threshold levels for the US, amounting to 14,100 and
10,700 for working-age and retirement, respectively.26 Moreover, η is set equal to 3 and β
equal to .9632 times the ratio of the length of retirement to the length of working age, to
account for the fact that retirement typically last for fewer years than working age.27 The
most disturbing feature of the outcome from this speciﬁcation is that total saving rates
are unreasonably high and decreasing in income. Empirical saving rates range from 6 to
14 percent for the two lowest income quintiles. Estimates for the top quintile range from
26Source: US Census Bureau. The ﬁgures represent poverty thresholds for a weighted average of three-
person households for working age, and a weighed average of two-person households with age greater or
equal to 65 years for retirement, respectively.
27Remember that 32 equals the length of the investment time-horizon. See footnote 9 for more details.
An annual discount factor of .96 corresponds to a usual assumption in the life-cycle literature. Moreover,
relative risk aversion is often set between 4 and 6. A value for η of 3 has been chosen as implying values
of relative risk aversion that come close to this range. Remember that for preferences (8) relative risk
aversion exceeds η for ﬁnite consumption levels.
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Figure 4a. Optimal investment rates under HARA
preferences, η = 3, subsistence consumptions accord-
ing to poverty thresholds.
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Figure 4b. Optimal investment rates under Stone-
Geary preferences (η = 1), subsistence consumptions
according to poverty thresholds.
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Figure 4c. Optimal investment rates under HARA
preferences, η = 3, low subsistence consumption ratio.
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Figure 4d. Optimal investment rates under Stone-
Geary preferences (η = 1), low subsistence consump-
tion ratio.
2524 to 34 percent.28 In light of this, the outcome of the baseline speciﬁcation can hardly
be accepted as a policy guideline.
It might seem that the problem of high and decreasing saving rates is alleviated when
η is set to a lower value. Figure 4b shows the outcome for the limit case where η = 1 (and
all other parameters are set equal to the baseline values). This corresponds to the usual
log-version of Stone-Geary preferences. Unfortunately, for this speciﬁcation total saving
rates are even less consistent with empirical observations. It turns out that decreasing
saving rates are avoided only if the ratio ¯ ¯ c2/¯ ¯ c1 is sharply reduced. Figure 4c shows
optimal plans when ¯ ¯ c1 is reduced by one quarter and ¯ ¯ c2 by three quarters compared to
age-speciﬁc poverty thresholds. All other parameters are again set equal to the baseline
values. Finally, Figure 4d shows a calibration for reduced subsistence levels when η = 1.29
In Figure 4d equity shares approach one already at relatively low incomes. Because of
this extreme outcome, the policy implications of this speciﬁcation seem again unaccept-
able. Thus, there are only the plans shown in Figure 4c that deserve serious attention.
For these, PAYGO rates are high but rapidly decreasing for incomes between 14,000 and
18,000. In this region, the PAYGO system is particularly valuable because it exhibits the
highest minimum return and thus assures the feasibility of old-age subsistence consump-
tion. This corresponds to the logic of the lexicographic model where a PAYGO system
allows to assure the habit level αc1 in the most eﬃcient way. For higher incomes, assuring
old-age subsistence consumption ceases to be a driving motive of portfolio choice under
HARA preferences. Thus, PAYGO investments are rather low. In contrast, equity savings
increase quite quickly.
The key diﬀerences between optimal plans under lexicographic and under HARA pref-
erences, according to the speciﬁcation underlying Figure 4c, are highlighted in Table 2
and 3. Table 2 presents equity investments as a share of total savings for mean incomes
of each income quintile, according to the estimates of the US Census Bureau.30 These
28See the estimates for saving rates including pensions and social security savings in Dynan et al.
(2004).
29Calibrations for alternative parameter speciﬁcations are available upon request.
30See http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h03ar.html.
26Table 2: Equity investments as a share of total savings.
Quintile Income LEX baseline LEX generalized HARA Empirical
First 10,136 0 0.06 NaN 0
Second 25,468 0 0.06 0.41 0
Third 42,629 0.36 0.08 0.53 0.07
Forth 66,839 0.76 0.38 0.58 0.37
Fifth 145,970 1 0.53 0.63 0.54
mean quintile incomes are reported in the second column. The third and fourth column
present equity shares as prescribed by the baseline and generalized lexicographic model,
respectively. The ﬁfth column shows equity shares that correspond to the HARA case.
Finally, the last column presents empirical estimates of equity shares from the Survey
of Consumer Finances 2001. It reports median equity shares, including equities hold
through mutual funds and private pensions, for each income quintile. (Observations with
age higher than 65 are dropped from the sample.)
Table 2 shows that under lexicographic preferences equity shares are much lower for
the second and third quintile than in the HARA case. In particular, prescribed equity
shares correspond more closely to empirical observations. Note that optimal choices are
not deﬁned under HARA preferences for the ﬁrst quintile. For the two top quintiles
both, the HARA and the generalized lexicographic model, track empirical equity shares
closely while equiy shares are much higher for the baseline version of the lexicographic
model. This is mainly due to the fact that α has been speciﬁed proportionally to the
average length of retirement age and there is no diversiﬁcation motive.31 Table 3 presents
PAYGO investments as a share of total savings. PAYGO shares are almost uniformly
higher under both lexicographic preferences. Moreover, the quantitative diﬀerence is
substantial for most quintiles. This is explained by the fact that under loss aversion the
favorable downside risk protection oﬀered by the PAYGO system is particularly valuable.
31See footnote 17 and 20.
27Table 3: PAYGO investments as a share of total savings.
Quintile Income LEX baseline LEX generalized HARA
First 10,136 1 0.50 NaN
Second 25,468 1 0.50 0.34
Third 42,629 0.64 0.51 0.27
Forth 66,839 0.24 0.62 0.24
Fifth 145,970 0 0.47 0.21
7 Conclusion
Poterba et al. (2003, p. 26) express the worry that ”... choices predicted by the CRRA
function may be a poor guide to actual behavior when the distribution of wealth outcomes
includes values near zero.” This paper has studied old-age provision and pension design
under lexicographic loss aversion preferences, which are consistent with the idea that
individuals are particularly averse to low investment outcomes. Calibrations of optimal
pension plans have been provided for two diﬀerent versions of the lexicographic model.
A baseline version focuses merely on the implications of loss aversion, abstracting from
diversiﬁcation issues. A second variant accounts for a more general pattern of risk aversion.
From a normative point of view, more weight should be put on the prescriptions of the
latter version of the model.
According to the generalized risk aversion variant of the model, optimal contribution
rates for a PAYGO system generally amount to 8 or 9 percent, when the ”returns” of the
system are simply given by the growth rate of aggregate wage income. Optimal equity
savings are zero for the two lowest income quintiles. Thereafter they increase up to a
value of 10 percent for the top quintile. For the sake of comparison, optimal plans have
also been derived for HARA preferences. It turns out that the identiﬁcation of a param-
eter constellation that leads to a reasonable outcome is not entirely straightforward. E.
g. the parameter constellation that has ex ante been chosen as a baseline case leads to
very high saving rates that decrease with income. Nevertheless, there exist parameter
28constellations for which optimal plans are a priori reasonable. Two major diﬀerences be-
tween these plans and optimal plans under lexicographic preferences have been identiﬁed.
First, the ratio of optimal PAYGO contribution rates to total saving rates is much higher
under lexicographic preferences due to loss aversion. Second, lexicographic loss aversion
preferences suggest much lower equity investments for the three lower income quintiles.
Such low equity investments are consistent with individuals’ actually observed portfolio
choices in this income range.
In light of the results of this paper, current PAYGO contribution rates for the US,
amounting to 12.4 percent, are not too far away from being optimal. To make the current
Social Security system sustainable, it would be necessary to reduce beneﬁt guarantees,
however. The analysis of this paper makes the case for the fact that individuals would be
better oﬀ with a partial reform leading to a PAYGO system without beneﬁt guarantees
than with a radical reform completely abandoning the PAYGO system.
Future research should extend the analysis of this paper to a setting with multiple
periods where labor income is risky and follows a typical inverted U-shape. This allows
to study the paths of contribution rates over time. Moreover, optimal contribution rates
of the PAYGO system should be considered in the presence of redistributive goals. A
further important issue is the study of transitions.
29References
Baxter, Marianne, and King, Robert G. (2001), ”The Role of International Investment
in a Privatized Social Security System,” in: Campbell, John Y., and Feldstein, Mar-
tin (eds.), Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 371-429.
Binswanger, Johannes (2004), ”Savings and Portfolio Choices with Three Risky Assets
under Lexicographic Loss Aversion Preferences,” Working Paper.
(2005), ”Understanding the Cross Section of Savings and Portfolio Choices,” GRE-
MAQ Working Paper, available at
http://www-gremaq.univ-tlse1.fr/perso/binswanger/working papers/Standard2P.pdf.
Board of Trustees (2005), The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Fed-
eral Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Washington,
D.C., http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR05.
Campbell, John Y., Cocco, Jo˜ ao F., Gomes, Francisco J., and Maenhout, Pascal J.
(2001), ”Investing Retirement Wealth: A Life-Cycle Model,” in: Campbell, John Y.,
and Feldstein, Martin (eds.), Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 439-73.
Cass, David, and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1970), ”The Structure of Investor Preferences and
Asset Returns, and Separability in Portfolio Allocation: A Contribution to the Pure The-
ory of Mutual Funds,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2, pp. 122-160.
Dynan, Karen E., Skinner, Jonathan and Zeldes, Stephen P. (2004), ”Do the Rich Save
More?” Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), pp. 397-444.
30Eeckhoudt, Louis, and Gollier, Christian (2001), ”Are Independent Optimal Risks Sub-
stitutes?” IDEI Working Paper.
Gollier, Christian (2001), The Economics of Risk and Time, MIT Press, Cambdrige, Mass.
(2005), ”Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Risk Taking of a Pension Fund,” mimeo.
Gomes, Francisco, and Michaelides, Alexander (2003), ”Portfolio Choice with Internal
Habit Formation: A Life-Cycle Model with Uninsurable Labor Income Risk,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 6, pp. 729-766.
Haliassos, Michael (2002), ”Stockholding: Recent Lessons from Theory and Computa-
tions,” in: Guiso, Luigi, Haliassos, Michael, and Japelli, Tullio (eds.), Stockholding in
Europe, Palgrave Macmillian Press, Hampshire, pp. 30-51.
Munnell, Alicia H. (2004), ”A Bird’s Eye View of the Social Security Debate,” An Is-
sue in Brief, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, December 2004, 25.
Poterba, James M. (2004), ”Portfolio Risk and Self-Directed Retirement Saving Pro-
grammes,” Economic Journal, Vol. 114, Issue 494, pp. 26-51.
, Rauh, Joshua, Venti, Steven and Wise David (2003), ”Utility Evaluation of Risk in
Retirement Saving Accounts,” NBER Working Paper 9892.
Shiller, Robert J. (2005a), ”The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Se-
curity: An Evaluation,” NBER Working Paper 11300.
(2005b), Irrational Exuberance, 2nd Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
31Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel (1991), ”Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), pp. 1039-
1061.
32CESifo Working Paper Series 




1509 Jean Hindriks and Ben Lockwood, Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: 
Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare, July 2005 
 
1510 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, Globalization 
and Domestic Conflict, July 2005 
 
1511 Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Non-Linear Exchange 
Rate Dynamics in Target Zones: A Bumpy Road towards a Honeymoon – Some 
Evidence from the ERM, ERM2 and Selected New EU Member States, July 2005 
 
1512 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 
1513 Christian Keuschnigg and Martin D. Dietz, A Growth Oriented Dual Income Tax, July 
2005 
 
1514 Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi, Monitoring a Common Agent: 
Implications for Financial Contracting, August 2005 
 
1515 Volker Grossmann and Panu Poutvaara, Pareto-Improving Bequest Taxation, August 
2005 
 
1516 Lars P. Feld and Emmanuelle Reulier, Strategic Tax Competition in Switzerland: 
Evidence from a Panel of the Swiss Cantons, August 2005 
 
1517 Kira Boerner and Silke Uebelmesser, Migration and the Welfare State: The Economic 
Power of the Non-Voter?, August 2005 
 
1518 Gabriela Schütz, Heinrich W. Ursprung and Ludger Wößmann, Education Policy and 
Equality of Opportunity, August 2005 
 
1519 David S. Evans and Michael A. Salinger, Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An 
Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers, August 2005 
 
1520 Michel Beine, Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi, The Impact of FX Central Bank 
Intervention in a Noise Trading Framework, August 2005 
 
1521 Volker Meier and Matthias Wrede, Pension, Fertility, and Education, August 2005 
 
1522 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Optimal Commodity Taxation when Land and 
Structures must be Taxed at the Same Rate, August 2005 
 
1523 Andreas Haufler and Søren Bo Nielsen, Merger Policy to Promote ‘Global Players’? A 
Simple Model, August 2005 
  
1524 Frederick van der Ploeg, The Making of Cultural Policy: A European Perspective, 
August 2005 
 
1525 Alexander Kemnitz, Can Immigrant Employment Alleviate the Demographic Burden? 
The Role of Union Centralization, August 2005 
 
1526 Baoline Chen and Peter A. Zadrozny, Estimated U.S. Manufacturing Production Capital 
and Technology Based on an Estimated Dynamic Economic Model, August 2005 
 
1527 Marcel Gérard, Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under 
Alternative Tax Designs, August 2005 
 
1528 Joerg Breitscheidel and Hans Gersbach, Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms, 
August 2005 
 
1529 Giorgio Fazio, Ronald MacDonald and Jacques Mélitz, Trade Costs, Trade Balances 
and Current Accounts: An Application of Gravity to Multilateral Trade, August 2005 
 
1530 Thomas Christiaans, Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, A Micro-Level ‘Consumer 
Approach’ to Species Population Dynamics, August 2005 
 
1531 Samuel Hanson, M. Hashem Pesaran and Til Schuermann, Firm Heterogeneity and 
Credit Risk Diversification, August 2005 
 
1532 Mark Mink and Jakob de Haan, Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political 
Budget Cycles in the European Union?, September 2005 
 
1533 Roberta Colavecchio, Declan Curran and Michael Funke, Drifting Together or Falling 
Apart? The Empirics of Regional Economic Growth in Post-Unification Germany, 
September 2005 
 
1534 Kai A. Konrad and Stergios Skaperdas, Succession Rules and Leadership Rents, 
September 2005 
 
1535 Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer, The Desire for Impact, September 2005 
 
1536 Wolfgang Buchholz and Wolfgang Peters, Justifying the Lindahl Solution as an 
Outcome of Fair Cooperation, September 2005 
 
1537 Pieter A. Gautier, Coen N. Teulings and Aico van Vuuren, On-the-Job Search and 
Sorting, September 2005 
 
1538 Leif Danziger, Output Effects of Inflation with Fixed Price- and Quantity-Adjustment 
Costs, September 2005 
 
1539 Gerhard Glomm, Juergen Jung, Changmin Lee and Chung Tran, Public Pensions and 
Capital Accumulation: The Case of Brazil, September 2005 
 
1540 Yvonne Adema, Lex Meijdam and Harrie A. A. Verbon, The International Spillover 
Effects of Pension Reform, September 2005  
1541 Richard Disney, Household Saving Rates and the Design of Social Security 
Programmes: Evidence from a Country Panel, September 2005 
 
1542 David Dorn and Alfonso Sousa-Poza, Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced 
Decision?, September 2005 
 
1543 Clara Graziano and Annalisa Luporini, Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and 
Optimal Board Structure, September 2005 
 
1544 Panu Poutvaara, Social Security Incentives, Human Capital Investment and Mobility of 
Labor, September 2005 
 
1545 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume, Can Deunionization Lead 
to International Outsourcing?, September 2005 
 
1546 Robert Inklaar, Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob de Haan, Trade and Business Cycle 
Synchronization in OECD Countries: A Re-examination, September 2005 
 
1547 Randall K. Filer and Marjorie Honig, Endogenous Pensions and Retirement Behavior, 
September 2005 
 
1548 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann and Bjoern-Jakob Treutler, Global Business 
Cycles and Credit Risk, September 2005 
 
1549 Ruediger Pethig, Nonlinear Production, Abatement, Pollution and Materials Balance 
Reconsidered, September 2005 
 
1550 Antonis Adam and Thomas Moutos, Turkish Delight for Some, Cold Turkey for 
Others?: The Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, September 2005 
 
1551 Peter Birch Sørensen, Dual Income Taxation: Why and how?, September 2005 
 
1552 Kurt R. Brekke, Robert Nuscheler and Odd Rune Straume, Gatekeeping in Health Care, 
September 2005 
 
1553 Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, Looking for 
Multiple Equilibria when Geography Matters: German City Growth and the WWII 
Shock, September 2005 
 
1554 Paul W. J. de Bijl, Structural Separation and Access in Telecommunications Markets, 
September 2005 
 
1555 Ueli Grob and Stefan C. Wolter, Demographic Change and Public Education Spending: 
A Conflict between Young and Old?, October 2005 
 
1556 Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, Why is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical?, October 
2005 
 
1557 Piotr Wdowinski, Financial Markets and Economic Growth in Poland: Simulations with 
an Econometric Model, October 2005  
1558 Peter Egger, Mario Larch, Michael Pfaffermayr and Janette Walde, Small Sample 
Properties of Maximum Likelihood Versus Generalized Method of Moments Based 
Tests for Spatially Autocorrelated Errors, October 2005 
 
1559 Marie-Laure Breuillé and Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Sharing Budgetary Austerity under Free 
Mobility and Asymmetric Information: An Optimal Regulation Approach to Fiscal 
Federalism, October 2005 
 
1560 Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer, Subsidizing Enjoyable Education, October 2005 
 
1561 Carlo Altavilla and Paul De Grauwe, Non-Linearities in the Relation between the 
Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals, October 2005 
 
1562 Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann, Distribution of Natural Resources, 
Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development: Growth Dynamics with Two Elites, 
October 2005 
 
1563 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Product Market Competition, Investment and 
Employment-Abundant versus Job-Poor Growth: A Real Options Perspective, October 
2005 
 
1564 Kai A. Konrad and Dan Kovenock, Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War, 
October 2005 
 
1565 Joerg Breitung and M. Hashem Pesaran, Unit Roots and Cointegration in Panels, 
October 2005 
 
1566 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Marc Schramm, Putting New Economic 
Geography to the Test: Free-ness of Trade and Agglomeration in the EU Regions, 
October 2005 
 
1567 Robert Haveman, Karen Holden, Barbara Wolfe and Andrei Romanov, Assessing the 
Maintenance of Savings Sufficiency Over the First Decade of Retirement, October 2005 
 
1568 Hans Fehr and Christian Habermann, Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of 
Progressive Pension Arrangements, October 2005 
 
1569 Jovan Žamac, Pension Design when Fertility Fluctuates: The Role of Capital Mobility 
and Education Financing, October 2005 
 
1570 Piotr Wdowinski and Aneta Zglinska-Pietrzak, The Warsaw Stock Exchange Index 
WIG: Modelling and Forecasting, October 2005 
 
1571 J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, Vincenzo Galasso and Paola Profeta, Early Retirement and 
Social Security: A Long Term Perspective, October 2005 
 
1572 Johannes Binswanger, Risk Management of Pension Systems from the Perspective of 
Loss Aversion, October 2005 